Sejarah Buruk dan tingkah laku bangsa Indonesia yg tdk menjaga nama Bangsa Indonesia yg JUJUR dan Peduli rakyat Miskin


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Initial Report on Suharto

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 55-68, December 31, 1968
Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, NIE 55-68. Secret

This National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA at the end of 1968 offers a positive portrait of Suharto and the New Order regime he had assembled following his ouster of Sukarno in March 1966 and consolidation of control in the intervening months. Just 18 months after the bloody massacres involving the murder of between 500,000 and one million alleged supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party, the NIE states that “the Suharto government provides Indonesia with a relatively moderate leadership.” The estimate reports, “There is no force in Indonesia today that can effectively challenge the army’s position, notwithstanding the fact that the Suharto government uses a fairly light hand in wielding the instruments of power. Over the next three to five years, it is unlikely that any threat to the internal security of Indonesia will develop that the military cannot contain; the army–presumably led by Suharto–will almost certainly retain control of the government during this period.”

Suharto’s Meetings With U.S. Officials

Indonesia: Background – The West Irian Question, July 10, 1969

Subject: Djakarta Visit: Your Meetings with President Suharto, July 18, 1969

National security adviser Henry Kissinger briefs President Nixon on his upcoming visit to Indonesia and likely conversations with Indonesian President Suharto. Kissinger argues that there is no U.S. interest in getting involved in the issue of West Irian and that its people will choose integration with Indonesia. In Nixon’s talking points, Kissinger urges that the President refrain from raising the issue except to note U.S. sympathy with Indonesia’s concerns.

Department of State, SECRET Memorandum from Henry Kissinger for the President, Subject: Your Meeting with President Suharto of Indonesia, May 26, 1970
Source: Richard M. Nixon Papers, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Box 2272

Suharto made his first visit as head of state to the U.S. in May 1970. The trip came amidst a major crackdown on political parties in Indonesia aimed at insuring the dominance of the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (GOLKAR) and the Army in parliamentary elections scheduled for 1971, as well as detailed revelations of pervasive corruption among government and military officials including smuggling, bribery, kickbacks and nepotism. Privately the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta warned that the corruption and authoritarianism of the New Order would progressively undermine its rule even as it eliminated or co-opted its opponents. Publicly, however, the White House fairly gushed over the state of relations with Jakarta and the Suharto regime’s performance, viewing the trip as a chance to strengthen its already cozy ties with the Indonesian dictator (who must have been surprised to learn that he presided over one of the “largest democratic countries in the world”). “There are no issues between the U.S. and Indonesia,” Henry Kissinger wrote the President approvingly, “and relations are excellent.” Suharto was offering to help support the U.S.-backed Lon Nol government in Cambodia, the regime continued to welcome American investors and pursue a “pragmatic” five year development plan, and Indonesia was increasingly identifying with U.S. regional goals as the Administration began its inexorable drawdown in South Vietnam. “What Suharto has done and is doing accords perfectly with your concept of Asian responsibilities under the Nixon Doctrine,” the national security advisor observed.

Memorandum of Conversation, President Suharto of Indonesia, The President, Dr. Kissinger, May 26, 1970
Source: Richard M. Nixon Papers, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Box 2272

In his meeting with President Nixon, Suharto frankly admits to having “nullified the strength” of the Indonesian Communist Party, an apparent reference to the mass killings of alleged PKI members, and states that “tens of thousands” of its members “have been interrogated and placed in detention.” President Nixon largely confines himself to questions and supportive statements concerning U.S. support for the Suharto regime. Over the course of Suharto’s two-day visit, the White House reassures Indonesian officials of their continued commitment to Southeast Asia and pledges to increase military aid to $18 million to enable Indonesia to purchase 15,000 M-16 rifles to replace the AK-47s it is covertly sending to Cambodia to assist the Lon Nol government which recently overthrew the government of Prince Sihanouk.

Memorandum of Conversation between President Ford, President Suharto, Dr. Kissinger, et al., July 5, 1975
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, Box 13, July 5, 1965 – Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian President Suharto

This document records a conversation between Suharto and Ford at Camp David on July 5, 1975, five months before the invasion of East Timor. Speaking only a few months after the collapse of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam, the two presidents shared a tour d’horizon of East Asian political issues, U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, international investment, and Portuguese decolonization. Suharto brought up the question of Portuguese decolonization in East Timor proclaiming his support for “self-determination” but also dismissing independence as unviable: “So the only way is to integrate [East Timor] into Indonesia.” Ford gives no response.

U.S. Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, December 6, 1975 [Text of Ford-Kissinger-Suharto Discussion]
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel File, Box A3, Country File, Far East-Indonesia, State Department Telegrams 4/1/75-9/22/76

On the eve of Indonesia’s full-scale invasion of East Timor, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger stopped in Jakarta en route from China where they had just met with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. For more than a year the U.S. had known that Indonesia was planning to forcibly annex East Timor, having followed intelligence reports of armed attacks by Indonesian forces for nearly two months. Thus, Ford or Kissinger could not have been too surprised when, in the middle of a discussion of guerrilla movements in Thailand and Malaysia, Suharto suddenly brought up East Timor. “We want your understanding,” Suharto stated, “if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.”

Ford and Kissinger took great pains to assure Suharto that they would not oppose the invasion. Ford was unambiguous: “We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have.” Kissinger did indeed stress that “the use of US-made arms could create problems,” but then added that, “It depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation.” Thus, Kissinger’s concern was not about whether U.S. arms would be used offensively—and hence illegally—but whether the act would actually be interpreted as such—a process he clearly intended to manipulate. In any case, Kissinger added: “It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly.”

U.S. Embassy Telegram 4890 from Jakarta to Secretary of State, “Meeting with Suharto,” April 18, 1977
Source: Freedom of Information Act request

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke’s visit to Jakarta in April 1977 and his lengthy meeting with President Suharto was the first by a high-ranking Carter Administration official.  The visit occurred during the run-up to tightly-controlled Presidential and parliamentary elections in which hundreds of Suharto opponents had been arrested and critical newspapers shuttered.  It thus represented, in the words of the U.S. Embassy, an “unusual opportunity” to advance concerns about human rights and democracy more generally – had that been Holbrooke’s intention.  In his meeting with Suharto, however, the Assistant Secretary offered no criticism of Indonesia’s human rights record while “acknowledging efforts President Suharto appeared to be making to resolve Indonesian problems,” especially on  East Timor, where he “applauded” the President’s judgment in allowing Congressional members to visit the territory but remained mute on reports of ongoing atrocities.  Suharto responded that Indonesia did “not seek to hide anything” in East Timor – at a time when journalists and relief organizations were banned and visitors allowed only under military escort.

Memorandum for the President from the Vice President, “Visit to the Pacific,” April 26, 1978
Source: NSA Staff Materials, Far East Files, Box 7, Carter Library

From May 9 to May 10, 1978,Vice President Walter Mondale visited Indonesia as part of a larger regional visit and the Carter Administration’s initiative to “deepen relations” with the Suharto regime. This Memo for President Carter requested his approval for Mondale’s policy goals for the trip, including the expedited delivery of sixteen A-4 fighter jets to Indonesia, which was then preparing for a massive campaign of aerial bombardment of East Timor in an effort to crush armed resistance to its occupation of the territory. Mondale’s briefing memo makes no mention of East Timor.

Telegram 12521 from Document: Telegram 6076 from Jakarta to State, “Summary of Vice President’s Meeting with Suharto,” May 10, 1978
Source: Freedom of Information Act request

In a May 10 meeting with Indonesian President Suharto, Mondale noted that Indonesia’s 1977 release of thousands of political detainees had “helped create a favorable climate of opinion in the Congress” for expanded American arms sales. He suggested to Suharto that releasing prisoners more regularly would further improve public opinion and deflect criticism – a suggestion the regime later implemented. The Vice President likewise noted the two nations’ “mutual concerns regarding East Timor,” in particular “how to handle public relations aspects of the problem.” As with the problem of political detainees, Mondale suggested that allowing humanitarian groups such as Catholic Relief Services access to East Timor would not only help refugees in the area (overwhelmingly generated by Indonesian military operations) but “have a beneficial impact on U.S. public opinion.”

Issues and Objectives for the Suharto Visit, Undated

Memo from Kenneth Dam for the President, Subject: Your Meeting with Suharto
, October 1, 1982

Summary of the President’s Plenary Session with President Suharto of the Republic of Indonesia, October 12, 1982

Source: Freedom of Information Act request

In October 1982 Suharto came to the U.S. on an official state visit, the highest honor accorded visiting dignitaries.  The briefing papers and summary of Suharto’s plenary session with President Reagan are most notable for what they do not contain – a single mention of human rights in Indonesia or East Timor.  The visit offers striking reminder of the degree to which the Reagan Administration abandoned any high level concern about human rights in Indonesia through the 1980s.

Telegram 14397 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department, Subject: [Deleted] views on East Timor developments, September 9, 1983

Telegram 15303 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State Department, Subject: Current Developments in East Timor
, September 23, 1983

Source: Freedom of Information Act request

In August 1983 East Timorese guerrillas attacked Indonesian military forces at the airport in Dili, killing 18 soldiers. In response to the attack, and as part of a larger military offensive involving 10,000-12,000 troops, Indonesian soldiers carried out several large massacres: of 200-300 civilians near the town of Viqueque, and at least 500 civilians in villages near Mount Bibileu. These two lengthy cables describe those operations and the breakdown of the ceasefire which preceded it, and fits a persistent pattern lasting from 1975 to 1999 in which U.S. Embassy officials expressed skepticism over the scale or even the existence of Indonesian atrocities in East Timor. In the second cable, the embassy officer repeats the claim, apparently from an Indonesian source (whose identity is excised), of several hundred killed near Viqueque.

Department of State Briefing Paper – US-Indonesian Security Relations

Telegram 08201 from American Embassy Jakarta to State Department, Vice-President’s Meeting with Soeharto, May 12, 1984
Source: Freedom of Information Act request

In May, 1984 Vice President George H. W. Bush visited Indonesia as part of a longer trip that included stops in Japan and South Asia. The briefing papers prepared for Vice President Bush highlight the continued focus on commercial and security relations over considerations of human rights.  In 1984 the U.S. provided $45 million in credits for foreign military sales (FMS) and $2.5 million in International Military and Educational Training (IMET), “our second largest IMET program worldwide.”  Vice-President Bush’s political scene setter notes that “political activity in Indonesia is tightly controlled,” with “no organized political activity” between national elections and opposition forces “dispirited and incapable for the foreseeable future of mounting a direct challenge to his power.”

Vice President Bush’s visit came on the heels of a major Indonesian military offensive in East Timor in which hundreds of civilians were massacred and in the midst of a period of severe repression in Indonesia punctuated by “a government-organized campaign of summary killings of alleged violent criminals” known as the “mysterious killings,” which began in late 1982 and continued through 1984.  The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta estimated that the government had summarily executed about 4,000 people, with continued killings reported.

In his meeting with Suharto, however, Bush, like Reagan and previous high-ranking U.S. officials, offered nothing but praise for the dictator, assuring him that “our relations with Indonesia are most significant and that we derived great satisfaction from our relations with Jakarta.”  As with Suharto’s 1982 visit to the U.S., there was no mention of human rights, and discussion focused largely on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China.

Suharto and Corruption

Memo from David Gunning from Peter Flanning, Weyerhauser Company – Indonesia Problems, December 5, 1972
Source: Nixon White House Central Files, Subject File, Country File Indonesia, Box 37

U.S. officials were aware from the start of the deeply entrenched corruption of the Suharto regime.  This memorandum outlines the sort of protection rackets the Suharto regime offered to foreign investors as the cost of doing business in Indonesia.  It details an arrangement that the Weyerhaeuser Company (one of the world’s largest timber companies) made with the Army for a timber concession in Borneo, offering the Army “a 35% interest in the concession at no cost in order to insure government cooperation.”   Weyerhaeuser officials express concern that “this arrangement has not provided the protection which was expected” and that “disconnected actions by disparate army officers and civil servants” in addition to the Army’s rake-off are threatening the company’s profitable operations.

Embassy Jakarta Telegram 12910 to Secretary of State, Indonesian Miracle Beclouded: Proposal for Action at IGGI, December 14, 1972
Source: Lot File 76D446, Box 12, National Archives

This lengthy telegram describes the mounting concern with corruption voiced by the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a donor consortium established in 1967 to coordinate foreign aid to Indonesia. It describes “increased, though fragmentary information of widespread and growing corruption” and “the consensus of all informed observers that scale is large and growing, that it involves highest echelons in government, and that this in turn is causing it to spread and deepen in all branches of social and economic life.”

Memo from Carleton Brower to the Ambassador, What Happened While You Were Away, August 10, 1973
Source: Lot File 76D446, Box 12, National Archives

Memorandum from Ted Heavner to Mr. Hummel, Suharto’s Involvement in Timber Concessions, September 7, 1973
Source: Lot File 76D446, Box 12, National Archives

These two memos describe Suharto’s personal intervention in a timber concession in Kalimantan being sought after by the International Paper Company. The head of IPC stated that “the matter was of the most extreme sensitivity; that Suharto would brook no interference.” The second memo describes how, after complex notions involving IPC and the Indonesian government, “Suharto and his people were talking over the entire concession for their own profit.”

In unusually blunt language, the memo describes Suharto’s purported plan: “three dummy corporations, one headed by his half-brother, one by his son, and one by the notorious Bob Hasan group, will reportedly exploit the concession. The memos seem to show that Suharto and his colleagues in this enterprise are totally uninterested in proper timber management or development of a wood processing industry and are intending only to rape the concession for maximum short term profit.” [Note: The memos summarized by these documents were not included in the lot file box at the U.S. National Archives.]


The Economist
Survey: Indonesia
Time to deliver
Dec 9th 2004
From The Economist print edition
— Indonesia has gone from near-dictatorship to vigorous democracy. Now it
needs to ensure that its people reap the benefits, says Edward McBride

Indonesians cannot eat democracy, sniffed Singapore’s Straits Times before the
last of Indonesia’s three elections this year. Singapore’s state-controlled
press may not be the most dogged defender of political freedoms, but the
newspaper has a point. Over the past six years, Indonesia has undergone a
remarkable transformation from near-dictatorship to vigorous democracy,
culminating in the inauguration in October of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the
country’s first directly elected president. But ordinary Indonesians have
little to show for it. Over the same period, the rapid growth in Indonesia’s
economy that had lifted millions out of poverty in the preceding decades
slowed down dramatically, and for a time went into reverse. Unemployment has
risen sharply. The new president now needs to harness his unprecedented
mandate to get the economy moving again and give his compatriots a stake in
their new democracy.

There is no questioning the magnitude of Indonesia’s achievement since the
call for reformasi gathered pace in 1998. In May of that year, massive
protests forced the resignation of Suharto, the country’s strongman of over 30
years. Since then, Indonesia’s political life has changed beyond recognition.
Elections, which once offered a choice of just three parties, now feature
dozens. In place of the sleepy old parliament, which elected Mr Suharto
unopposed seven times, there is a newly assertive body which churned through
three different presidents in the three years following his resignation.
Voters, too, are throwing their weight around: in choosing Mr Yudhoyono, they
rejected the incumbent president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and the big parties
that supported her. The courts, which used to follow the regime’s bidding,
have won complete independence. The many disparate regions of this vast
archipelago, previously subservient to the central government’s whims, now
hold all but a handful of the powers that used to be wielded from Jakarta.

The army, which formed the bedrock of Mr Suharto’s regime, is back in the
barracks, although never far away. Active servicemen can no longer moonlight
in the bureaucracy. The Ministry of Defence is now headed by a civilian. The
police, formerly just another repressive branch of the armed forces, have been
hived off and redirected from fighting opponents of the regime to fighting

Instead of a handful of cowed media, Indonesia now boasts a cornucopia of
competing television channels, magazines and newspapers—state-owned and
private, local and national, specialised and generalist, in many languages—to
cater to every conceivable taste and interest. The same applies to trade
unions, NGOs and other pressure groups, which have proliferated throughout the
country. Perhaps the best indication of public enthusiasm for democratic
diversity is the election turnout, which was around 80% in each of this year’s
elections (one for parliament and one for president, in two rounds).

Yet whereas Indonesian voters are doing their bit for democracy, it has not
done much for them. Under Mr Suharto’s authoritarian regime, the economy grew
by an average of 7% a year; since he stepped down in 1998, it has managed only
half that rate (although thanks partly to problems of Mr Suharto’s making). In
that year itself, as the Asian economic crisis took hold, the economy shrank
by 13%. Growth is now up again, to perhaps 5% this year, but remains much
lower than in the late 1980s. The economy regained its pre-crisis size only in
2002. Measured per person, it did not recover until this year.

With such feeble growth, many Indonesians are out of work. Before the crash,
the unemployment rate never rose above 5%; now it is over 9% (see chart 1).
Economists estimate that another 30% of the workforce is underemployed. And
these figures are climbing steadily as some 2m young Indonesians enter the job
market every year.

No wonder, then, that Indonesia’s admirable progress on poverty reduction has
also stalled. Between 1965 (when Mr Suharto seized power) and 1996, the
proportion of Indonesians living in poverty fell from 60% to 16%, by the World
Bank’s measure. During the crisis the poverty rate shot up, and has only
recently fallen back to its 1996 level. The number of Indonesians subsisting
on less than $2 a day—slightly above the Bank’s poverty line—remains a
worrying 50%, just as it was in 1996.

Indonesians are also less secure than they were in Mr Suharto’s day—except, of
course, for the bloodbath that accompanied his rise to power, and the lesser
violence surrounding his removal. Muslims and Christians continue to clash
periodically in the provinces of Maluku and Central Sulawesi. Indigenous
tribes in Kalimantan have mounted pogroms against immigrants from other parts
of the country. The long-simmering insurgency in Aceh, at the country’s
western tip, has boiled over into outright war. At the opposite end of the
country, in Papua, separatist agitation continues.

Terrorism has become another blight in recent years. The bomb that killed some
200 people in the resort of Kuta in Bali in October 2002 was the deadliest
attack the world had seen since September 11th 2001. Subsequent bombings have
fortunately claimed far fewer lives, but have helped to cement Indonesia’s
undeserved reputation as a hotbed of Islamic extremism.

For that reason, if no other, the outside world will be following Mr
Yudhoyono’s progress with concern. An ill-governed and impoverished Indonesia
would inevitably export terrorism, piracy, pollution, instability and illegal
immigrants to its neighbours. It would also disrupt shipping in the Strait of
Malacca, a transit point for a quarter of the world’s seaborne trade.

A model of sorts
Conversely, access to Indonesia’s enormous and underexploited natural
resources could prove a boon for the global economy in an era of high
commodity prices. On a more abstract level, Indonesia is often seen as a
bellwether for developing countries, especially Muslim ones. With 220m people,
85% of whom are Muslim, Indonesia is the biggest Muslim country in the world,
and the fourth most populous of any faith. At the moment, it is the best proof
of the cherished belief that Islam and democracy can co-exist. It is the only
East Asian member of the Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries. In its
heyday, it was the linchpin of stability in South-East Asia and a model of
rapid development. The Non-Aligned Movement grew from a summit in Bandung in
1955, and the headquarters of the Association of South-East Asian Nations are
in Jakarta.

For now, however, most foreigners regard Indonesia as more of a cautionary
tale than a model. That is a judgment Mr Yudhoyono must reverse. For the fate
of his presidency rests on the economy, and the fate of the economy rests on
attracting foreign investment.
The Jakarta
December 09, 2004
Subsidizing the rich

Indonesian presidents after Soeharto are likely to have learned one important
lesson from the former dictator: Don’t slip on the oil. Politically, oil is
indeed a slippery commodity for Indonesia. Every president since Soeharto has
had to think twice before taking any decision to raise fuel prices, as every
time a government increases them, there is almost certainly going to be a
public backlash.

Megawati Soekarnoputri knew that well, and used oil to fire up her reelection
bid this year, by keeping domestic fuel prices constant amid soaring
international oil prices.

Despite what was arguably a highly irresponsible policy, there was no helping
her reelection bid, and now there is also a hefty burden on the new
government, in the form of Rp 45 trillion (US$6 billion) in extra costs for
the additional fuel subsidies for this year alone.

The current administration has no choice but to increase fuel prices to reduce
the subsidies. There are a number of reasons for why reducing fuel subsidies
is far more urgent now than ever before.

In the past, high crude oil prices used to be a good news when the country was
a net oil exporter. High prices meant a windfall profit for the country. Now
this situation has changed and this year for the first time the country has
become a net importer of oil.

In the past, before Indonesia decentralized its finances, all proceeds from
oil and gas went to the national government, however, now, the government has
to share 15 percent of non-tax revenues from oil and 30 percent from gas with
the regions where oil and gas resources are located.

However, in terms of spending, the central government bears all the costs for
subsidizing the fuel. For the government, maintaining fuel prices at the
current level is increasingly unsustainable — according to Vice President
Jusuf Kalla it is burdening the state with costs of up to Rp 10 trillion a
month in subsidies, depending on international oil prices.

Even if prices were not as bad as they are now and Indonesian again became a
net exporter of fuel, it is still not wise to keep Indonesian fuel prices so
low compared to those in the region.

As a comparison, gasoline that the Indonesian government retails at about US
20 cents a liter, sells at 85 cents in Singapore and 53 cents in Thailand.
Like all subsidies, this low-price policy is subject to abuse.

As often reported, subsidies in Indonesia have frequently failed to help their
intended target; the poor. Many subsidies end up benefiting the more affluent
groups in society because of their strong purchasing power or simply because
of corruption. Fuel subsidies are glaring examples of where subsidies end up
benefiting high-income groups although the original justification for their
existence was to assist the poor.

Subsidies for auto diesel and gasoline fuel mostly benefit car owners, whose
incomes are in the top 10 percent bracket of Indonesians.

Even subsidies for kerosene, a main cooking fuel, end up benefiting relatively
high-income groups most, as according to the World Bank report Poverty
Reduction in Indonesia: Constructing a New Strategy, 2001, the poor consumed
only 20 percent of the subsidized kerosene sold.

The other downside to fuel subsidies is the widespread fuel smuggling to
neighboring countries and the excessive domestic use of fuels resulting in
higher pollution. If domestic prices are set at similar levels with those in
the neighboring countries — smuggling would stop and consumers would use fuel
more economically.

Worse still, the increasing burden of subsidies left unchecked will eventually
increase public debt, already at high levels.

And allowing public debt to increase will only eat into the government’s
budget to finance programs for the poor.

It is clear now that fuel subsidies cannot be justified on any grounds, except
politically. So, rather than subsidizing the rich, encouraging smuggling,
creating pollution, and building up public debt as a result of fuel subsidies,
why not abolish such subsidies altogether.

However, cutting subsidies is not an easy task as they benefit groups that
often have political clout.

What the government needs to consider now is how to chose the timing of the
subsidy reductions and prepare targeted compensation programs for the poor,
who are definitely likely to suffer from an increased prices of fuel.

The government also needs to consult with Bank Indonesia about how to
implement the price increases in order to mitigate adverse inflationary

Most importantly, the government needs to put out a message debunking the myth
that fuel subsidies end up benefiting the poor.
The Jakarta
National News
December 10, 2004
House, parties ‘most corrupt’
M. Taufiqurrahman, The Jakarta Post/Jakarta

As if to confirm public indignation towards corrupt politicians, a report from
an international corruption watchdog said Thursday that the House of
Representatives (DPR) and political parties were the most corrupt institutions
in the country.

In its corruption barometer report for 2004 issued Wednesday, Transparency
International Indonesia (TI Indonesia) said that the House and political
parties ranked first in the corruption index, followed by the customs and
excise office, the judiciary, the police and the tax office.

The international graft watchdog said that the index of public perception of
both the House and political parties was 4.4 out of a maximum 5 points, at
which point an institution can be categorized as “very corrupt”.

Indexes for the customs and excise office, the judiciary, police and tax
office was 4.3, 4.2, 4.2 and 4 respectively.

In measuring the corruption index, TI Indonesia interviewed more than 1,200
people in Jakarta, Surabaya and Medan between July and September 2004.

In 2003, the judiciary was found by TI Indonesia to be the most corrupt
institution with 32.8 percent of respondents saying the agency was corrupt,
followed by political parties in second position with 16.3 percent.

Strangely, the 2004 survey claimed that the immigration office was perceived
by Indonesians as being the least corrupt government agency with an index of

According to TI Indonesia, an institution is declared free from corruption if
the index is 1.

Other institutions that have low level of corruption are non-governmental
organizations with an index of 2.4 and the media 2.6.

The Indonesian Military (TNI) was placed in the middle ranks with an index of
3.3, just above educational institutions with 3.2.

TI Indonesia’s findings were parallel with the results of similar surveys
conducted in 62 countries around the world.

“Of 62 countries surveyed, people in 36 countries drew the same conclusion
that political parties were the most corrupt institutions,” executive board
chairman of TI Indonesia Todung Mulya Lubis told a press briefing.

Todung said that corruption in political parties was a grave threat to the
country’s political system as the parties were the institutions where members
of the legislative and executive branch were recruited.

TI Indonesia secretary general Emmy Hafild said that corruption in the two
institutions was manifested in several ways, including bribery from companies
of House members who planned to scrutinize them on their dubious activities.

House members acted as brokers to help private companies get government
contracts and received financial inducements when conducting “fit and proper
tests” for public officers.

Emmy also said that political parties were also used by corruptors from the
previous regime as safe havens from corruption litigation.

In its recommendation, TI Indonesia said that to prevent political parties and
the House from becoming the new hallmarks of corruption in the country,
greater accountability was required from both institutions.

“The law on general elections and political parties must be amended so as to
require more rigid accountability of electoral candidates,” TI Indonesia said.

As for the House, TI Indonesia said the recruitment process for those wanting
to sit in the lawmaking institution must be made impregnable to money
The Guardian (UK)
Thursday, December 9, 2004
Guardian Victory in Arms Bribe Case
David Leigh, David Pallister, Rob Evans, and John Aglionby in Jakarta

The high court yesterday ordered the release of files disclosing payments by a
leading British arms company to the daughter of the then president of
Indonesia in a landmark ruling for freedom of information.

Mr Justice Park ruled that the Guardian should be allowed access to the court
file containing witness statements by the then chief executive of Alvis, a
tank manufacturer based in Coventry.

It had been alleged that Alvis paid £16.5m in bribes to President Suharto’s
eldest daughter to secure a £160m sale of Scorpion tanks in the mid-1990s
which were then used for internal repression.

Alvis attempted to keep the documents secret. But after hearing arguments over
three days from Anthony Hudson, counsel for the Guardian, the high court
ordered that the newspaper could have copies of the material.

The judge said the Guardian was a serious newspaper, and there was no reason
why it could not have access to the court file.

The witness statements formed part of the evidence in an earlier, unreported
case in which a former consultant to Alvis, Chan U Seek, claimed £6m
commission on the tanks sale. “The proceedings between Alvis and Mr Chan were
not a private arbitration. They were in open court, and unwelcome publicity
for a defendant, including a successful defendant, is not uncommonly a
consequence to any case,” the judge said.

A large number of internal company memos were disclosed in the Chan hearing,
including one from the chief executive referring to the payments to President
Suharto’s daughter as “a tax”. She was referred to in company coded messages
as “the lady”.

But before the case could be reported, Alvis unexpectedly settled, with a
confidentiality agreement that nothing further was to be said about the case.
The witness statements handed over yesterday, and published on the Guardian’s
website today, reveal that Alvis executives tried for years to secure the
support of influential people close to the government and the army.

Eventually they were able to hire President Suharto’s eldest daughter, known
as Tutut, along with another agent, the daughter of an army officer, to get
the backing of the army.

The 100 Scorpion light tanks were sold with the promise from the Indonesian
regime that they would not be used for internal repression. However, they were
subsequently discovered in action in the breakaway province of East Timor and
in Aceh. The sales were backed by the British government’s Export Credits
Guarantee Department, which was left to pick up a £93m bill when Indonesia ran
into a financial crisis. President Suharto was ousted and Indonesia has asked
to postpone payment of its debts.

Susan Hawley, of the anti-corruption campaign the Corner House, said the
Export Credits Guarantee Department “should have spotted that the president’s
daughter was involved. Why didn’t alarm bells ring?”

Tapol, the Indonesian human rights campaign, called for a full investigation
by both British and Indonesian governments. Its spokesman said: “The
allegations further strengthen the case for a freeze on British arms sales to
Indonesia. This immoral and corrupt trade will do nothing to promote democracy
or development in the country.”

Alvis is now owned by BAE Systems. Richard Coltart, BAE spokesman, said: “We
have no comment on this matter other than to point out that it relates to an
Alvis issue before our ownership of the company.”

Former president Suharto’s daughter, Tutut, declined to comment on the
allegations. An aide told the Guardian on condition of anonymity: “Of course
Ms Tutut was involved in these deals but I’m sure she did nothing illegal.”

Alan Rusbridger, the Guardian’s editor, said yesterday: “This is an important
judgment for the press. The judge has recognised that it’s important that
newspapers are free to cover court proceedings – and that, in the modern
world, it’s difficult, if not impossible, to do so without access to the court

“Journalists should now find it easier to view court documents, which is only
appropriate on the eve of the introduction of a Freedom of Information Act.”
The Guardian (UK)
Thursday, December 9, 2004
Alvis: the president’s family and the payoffs
— Tank sale to Suharto’s Indonesia was mired in corruption
Rob Evans, David Leigh, David Pallister and John Aglionby in Jakarta

Britain’s controversial sale of tanks to Indonesia was a thoroughly corrupt
transaction, according to the Alvis documents released yesterday to the

If the deal were to take place today, it would be a criminal offence under
recent legislation. Witness statements by Alvis executives describe in rare
detail the way in which generals and members of ex-president Suharto’s family
were paid off.

The local agents were required to be Indonesian army family members. The
proceeds had to be split with a company currently owned by the Indonesian
military. And finally, to get the £160m required released from the
impoverished country’s budget, Suharto’s daughter herself had to be recruited
and rewarded.

The high court heard that £16.5m was paid into offshore accounts – a rake-off
of around 10% of the deal’s value.

“Madam Tutut”, as Alvis’s chief executive, Nick Prest, termed her, first
appeared in London in February 1994, Alvis says. Mr Prest recorded that she
met him and two other Alvis executives, Trevor Harrison and Lionel Steele.

“Her real name was Mrs Siti Rakhmana … the eldest daughter of the then
president Suharto … She encouraged us to make arrangements with her
associates to put a consultancy agreement in place. She provided her services
through a company called Global Select.”

Alvis plc signed the deal with her on May 4 1994, promising her money “to
assist with sales of the Scorpion [tank]”.

She turned up in England again two months later to visit the Alvis plant in
Coventry with two army generals in tow, Lt Gen Hartoho and Lt Gen Mantiri.

“The purpose of this visit was to provide the armed forces with final
reassurance concerning their commitment to Alvis before pressing the button,”
Mr Prest says.

Another Alvis executive, Lionel Steele, recorded that if the attention of the
president’s family was attracted to a deal, they “would automatically want to
be involved in any large contract”.

Alvis’s local agent, Rini Soewondho, testified: “Arrangements for the
presidential budget could only be made if they were supported by President
Suharto. This usually meant seeking support from a member of his ‘inner

Thanks to Tutut, the money came through to buy 50 brand-new light tanks,
costing £1.6m each. Ironically, in view of the furore at the time in Britain
about the use of the tanks to suppress rebels, there appears to have been no
real military demand for such extravagant weapons.

Suharto, the documents reveal, was interested in the idea merely because he
thought the army’s existing armoured cars looked unimpressive.

The first sale was authorised by the Major government in Britain, after what
Alvis’s chief executive called “a lot of work … in the light of the
political antipathy”. The export licence came through in March 1995.

Alvis then sought to exploit its Tutut channel to get a repeat big sale of
Scorpions. A payment deal was signed through a fresh Tutut offshore vehicle,
called Basque.

But this time there was a problem. “The Koreans … were offering a
competitive vehicle on generous credit terms. We were able to see off this
competition … Madam Tutut was instrumental in achieving this.”

Despite the fact that the first Alvis shipment had been in such a rush that
the tanks did not work properly, another £80m was found from the Indonesian
treasury to buy 50 more of them.

Mr Steele records: “They had intended to purchase three battalions but at that
point the Asian economic crisis took place, the Indonesian rupiah was devalued
from 2,300 to 13,000 to the dollar and President Suharto was ousted.

“The new government had more urgent priorities than buying our vehicles”.

The documents show that payment was made by Alvis at every level to make arms

Their agents, Rini and her brother Didie, were children of a former top
Indonesian army officer. “The minister of defence issued a directive,” Rini
records, “that the purchase of all defence equipment from foreign companies
must be made through agencies … owned by retired Indonesian military
personnel (or a member of his family)”.

Alvis duly signed up with their company PT Surya Kepanjen. Rini and Didie in
turn put Alvis in touch with the deputy chief of staff of the army, Gen

According to Rini, the generals wanted their cut. “[Gen Sahallah] said a
company named PT Truba would also have to be appointed.” That company, Alvis’s
chief executive testified, “was owned by the Indonesia army”.

The Guardian is publishing the key documents on its website today.
British court orders release of files in Britain-Indonesia probe: Daily
London, Dec. 9 (AFP)

A British court has ordered the release of files disclosing payments by a
leading British arms company to the daughter of former Indonesian president
Suharto, the Guardian newspaper said Thursday.

The High Court of Justice ruled that the Guardian should be allowed access to
the court file containing witness statements by the then chief executive of
Alvis, a tank manufacturer based in Coventry, it said.

The Guardian has reported allegations that Alvis paid 16.5 million pounds
(US$31.9 million) in bribes to Soeharto’s eldest daughter to secure a 160
million pound ($309 million) sale of Scorpion tanks in the mid-1990s which
were then used for internal repression.

Alvis attempted to keep the documents secret, but the high court eventually
ruled that the newspaper could have copies of the material, the newspaper

The witness statements formed part of the evidence in an earlier, unreported
case in which a former consultant to Alvis, Chan U Seek, claimed six million
pounds commission on the tanks sale.

A large number of internal company memos were disclosed in the Chan hearing,
including one from the chief executive referring to the payments to president
Suharto’s daughter as “a tax,” the Guardian said.

But before the case could be reported, Alvis unexpectedly settled, with a
confidentiality agreement that nothing further was to be said about the case,
the Guardian said.

The witness statements handed over Wednesday, and published on the Guardian’s
website (, reveal that Alvis executives tried for years to
secure the support of influential people close to the government and the army,
it said.

Eventually they were able to hire president Suharto’s eldest daughter, known
as Tutut, along with another agent, the daughter of an army officer, to get
the backing of the army.

The 100 Scorpion light tanks were sold with the promise from the Indonesian
regime that they would not be used for internal repression. However, they were
subsequently discovered in action in the breakaway province of East Timor and
in Aceh, the Guardian said.

The sales were backed by the British government’s Export Credits Guarantee
Department, which was left to pick up a 93 million pound bill when Indonesia
ran into a financial crisis, it said.

President Suharto was ousted and Indonesia has asked to postpone payment of
its debts.
The Guardian (UK)
Saturday December 11, 2004
Indonesia calls inquiry into British arms firm payment
John Aglionby in Jakarta, Rob Evans, David Pallister and David Leigh

Anti-corruption investigators in Indonesia launched an inquiry yesterday into
the Guardian’s disclosures that a British arms company paid £16.5m to ex-
president Suharto’s daughter over a deal to sell light tanks.

The deputy head of the independent anti-corruption commission, Erry
Hardjapamekas, said the disclosures were “a high-profile case that has to be a
major concern” for his body.

“It appears the state budget may have been used to buy these tanks and that
the deal may have contained irregularities,” he said. “If that’s the case and
it caused losses to the state, it’s corruption and cannot be tolerated.”

In London, the national criminal intelligence service (NCIS) has been asked by
the trade secretary, Patricia Hewitt, to investigate the claims surrounding
Alvis, which widened yesterday to include BAE, Britain’s biggest arms firm.

Court papers obtained by the Guardian say BAE, which is already under
investigation by the Serious Fraud Office over corruption allegations, used
the same agents as Alvis. In a case whose files were disclosed to the
Guardian, the high court was told by Philip Shepherd QC: “BAE were also trying
to sell Hawk aircraft to Indonesia … They also shared information and
eventually were both apparently using the same Indonesian local agents, Rini
and Didie Soewondho, and their company, PTSK.”

The agents also acted for another arms company, Royal Ordnance, which is now,
too, absorbed by BAE.

The British taxpayer ended up picking up much of the tab for the Hawk
transaction, along with the Alvis deal, after Indonesia’s financial crisis.

BAE, which now owns Alvis, refuse to comment on the allegations other than to
say it did not break any laws or commit any wrongdoing.

In Indonesia, the investigation into Siti “Tutut” Hardiyanti Rukmana,
Suharto’s eldest daughter, would be the anti-corruption commission’s first
ever into the Suharto inner circle.

Mr Hardjapamekas, the commission’s deputy, said yesterday that he would
probably approach the British govern ment for help. “We will need everything
relating to this case and they should be able to help us with that.”

The commission has sweeping powers to act and detain suspects without the
permission of the notoriously corrupt public prosecutor’s office.

The government tried to prosecute Mr Suharto for corruption four years ago,
but the case collapsed after doctors ruled he was too sick to stand trial.
Many observers believe that, until now, the family has wielded sufficient
influence to avoid investigations.

Mr Hardjapamekas declined to speculate on who would be investigated, but the
court documents name two former army chiefs, Generals Hartono and Wismoyo
Arisunandar, one former deputy army chief and several other senior generals.
Gen Hartono has been extremely close to Ms Tutut for years, while Gen Wismoyo
married Tutut’s aunt.

Commission officials are likely to demand documents from the army, the
military headquarters, the finance ministry, the political and security
ministry and the state planning board, said Junino Jahja, a senior
The Jakarta
National News
December 13, 2004
KPK shows interests in $31m bribery case involving Tutut
Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The powerful Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is following up
allegations that former president Soeharto’s daughter, Siti “Tutut” Hardiyanti
Rukmana, received US$31 million in bribes from a British arms company to sell
tanks to Indonesia a decade ago.

KPK deputy chairman Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas said on Saturday the commission
was studying documents obtained from the Guardian (British) newspaper that
released a report on the case.

“We have met representatives of the newspaper, and are currently looking into
the reports. Should the case be strong enough, we will then move forward with
the investigation,” Erry told The Jakarta Post.

He said the case had drawn the KPK’s interest as it involved Tutut, the eldest
daughter of Soeharto. Soeharto remains a suspect for stealing US$571 million
of state assets during his 32-year rule but was declared too ill to stand
trial in September 2002.

“Of course we are interested in finding out more facts about the allegations
leveled at Tutut,” Erry said. The commission would soon ask for formal
documents, such as the contract and other papers related to the deal, he said.

The Guardian reported that British arms firm Alvis paid some US$31.9 million
in bribes to Tutut to secure the sale of 100 Scorpion tanks to the Indonesian
Army in the mid-1990s.

The report said that Alvis’ former consultant, Chan U Seek, called the
payment “a tax” to seal the deal.

The firm had been trying to keep the documents a secret but the English High
Court on Thursday ordered the release of the files.

One of Soeharto’s close aides told the Post that Tutut was aware of the
accusations, but so far did not see any urgency in responding to the reports.

“So far Mbak Tutut has no intention of making any comments, and I don’t think
she has contacted her lawyers regarding the matter,” the aide said.

The case could kickstart fresh attempts to implicate the Soeharto family for
corruption, collusion and nepotism that critics say has landed members great
personal wealth during Soeharto’s presidency.

His doctors claim the former strongman suffered a stroke that has adversely
affected his speaking ability.

His aides say Soeharto can no longer write or read, although physically he is
in good shape.

“He can still walk unaided, but the problems remain in his ability to talk,
read and write. He can only sign papers,” the aide said.

If Tutut is prosecuted over the case, she will not be the first of Soeharto’s
offspring to run foul of the law.

One of his sons, Hutomo “Tommy” Mandala Putra, is a convicted murderer and is
serving a 15-year jail sentence in Nusakambangan maximum security prison,
Central Java, for killing a Supreme Court justice who had sentenced him for
corruption offenses.


Paras Indonesia – January, 18 2006

An Indonesian banker who fled the country a few weeks prior to being sentenced to eight years in jail for embezzling Rp1.27 trillion ($139 million) has been arrested in the US and handed over to Indonesian authorities.

Following a request from the Indonesian government, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) located David Nusa Wijaya alias Ng Tjuen Wie (44), the former boss of now-defunct Bank Umum Sertivia, in Los Angeles on January 13.

A statement from the US Embassy in Jakarta said Wijaya was brought back to Indonesia on Tuesday (17/1/06) by FBI and Indonesian police officials.

“The United States government is pleased to be of assistance to Indonesia in this matter. The US government understands that returning fugitives and stolen assets from abroad in corruption cases is a top law enforcement priority in Indonesia, and looks forward to cooperating with Indonesia in other cases in the future,” said the embassy statement.

After arriving in Jakarta at 12.30pm, Wijaya was taken to National Police headquarters for interrogation. In addition to his corruption conviction, he is likely to now face charges of fleeing justice, although he might be able to avoid this by threatening to name some of the senior officials who allegedly facilitated his escape. He was due to be formally handed over to the Attorney General’s Office on Wednesday afternoon and then taken to East Jakarta’s Cipinang jail to begin serving his sentence.

Legal Charades
Bank Umum Sertivia was one of many domestic banks that received Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) funds at the height of the regional economic crisis over 1997-98. About 95% of the Rp144.5 trillion ($16.8 billion) pumped into the banks was misused.

On March 11, 2002, West Jakarta District Court sentenced Wijaya to a mere one year in jail for his staggering misuse of BLBI funds. The court argued the light sentence was justified because of Wijaya’s “good behavior” and that it was necessary to give him a chance to raise the Rp1.27 trillion that he had promised to repay to the state.

Wijaya remained free pending appeal, so the Attorney General’s Office imposed a one-year travel ban on him on July 5, 2002.

The tycoon filed his first appeal to Jakarta High Court, but judges there on August 12, 2002, increased his sentence to four years behind bars. He then appealed to the Supreme Court, where judges on July 23, 2003, further increased the sentence to eight years.

But by that time Wijaya’s travel ban had already been expired for more than two weeks and was not extended by the Attorney General’s Office. According to the Immigration Office, Wijaya had left Indonesia shortly after the ban expired.

As the relevant ancillary of the Attorney General’s Office, the West Jakarta Prosecutor’s Office was required to execute the Supreme Court’s verdict by sending Wijaya to jail. But the prosecutor’s office claimed it did not receive an official copy of the verdict until July 28, 2004 – more than one year after the sentence had been handed down and the felon had long flown the coop.

The Supreme Court claimed the extremely late delivery of the verdict was due to a mere “administrative shortcoming” because of personnel changes involving clerks dealing with Wijaya’s case files.

The pathetic charade continued in August 2004, when hapless prosecutors showed up at Wijaya’s house, delivered a letter ordering him to begin serving his sentence, and expressed optimism he had not fled the country.

There was strong speculation that Wijaya had initially fled to Singapore, which does not have an extradition agreement with Indonesia. The two nations last year held a series of talks aimed at forging such a treaty, so that Indonesia can bring crooked tycoons and their ill-gotten wealth back to the country. Attorney General Abdul Rahman Saleh last week accused Singapore of delaying the pact by insisting that it be signed later this year as part of a general security agreement.

In addition to Singapore and the US, Wijaya was also rumored to have spent time in China, Hong Kong, Macao and Australia while on the run.

National Police chief General Sutanto said Wijaya had first gone to Singapore and later moved to San Francisco, where he had recently faced immigration problems.

”He was given two choices. The first was for him to go through the legal process in the US and then be deported, while the second was to voluntarily undergo the legal process in Indonesia. He eventually chose the latter,” said Sutanto.

Yudhoyono Pleased
The arrest of Wijaya is a major victory in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s war on corruption. The president on Tuesday hailed the US government’s decision to hand over an Indonesian corruption fugitive and urged other countries to follow suit.

“I am grateful to the friendly country that helped David Nusa Wijaya be brought to justice,” he said.

“This is exiting news and I hope the other graft fugitives who fled abroad will do the same by returning the state assets and money to the people,” he added.

Deputy Attorney General for intelligence Basrief Arief, who heads an integrated team that was formed to track down Indonesia’s 13 most-wanted graft fugitives, was equally jubilant. “Thanks be to God we arrested David Nusa Wijaya in the US and he arrived in Indonesia at 12.30pm on a Thai Airways flight,” he was quoted as saying by detikcom online news portal.

Yudhoyono called on the remaining 12 fugitives to immediately give themselves up and return their ill-gotten gain to the state.

“I ask that other friendly countries be cooperative and give their support to facilitate the return of 12 Indonesian citizens who have been found guilty or fled before their cases were settled,” he said.

Following is look at some of Indonesia’s top corruptors still at large:

  • Eddy Tanzil: Sentenced in 1994 to 20 years in jail for his role in a $620 million corruption case involving state-owned Bank Bapindo. He walked out of the jail in 1995 after allegedly bribing wardens and is now believed to be living in China.
  • Bambang Sutrisno: Former vice president of now-defunct Bank Surya, convicted of embezzling Rp1.5 trillion, sentenced to life imprisonment, now apparently living in Singapore.
  • Andrian Kiki Ariawan: Former president director of now-defunct Bank Surya, convicted of embezzling Rp1.5 trillion, sentenced to life imprisonment, now apparently living in Singapore.
  • Samadikun Hartono: Former president director of now-defunct Bank Modern, convicted of embezzling Rp169 billion, sentenced to four years in jail, whereabouts unknown.
  • Sudjiono Timan: Former president director of state-owned investment company PT Bahana Pembinaan Usaha Indonesia, sentenced to 15 years in jail in connection with a Rp1.1 trillion corruption case involving the channeling of state funds to former dictator Suharto’s cronies. Believed to be in Singapore.
  • Maria Pauline Lumowa: Boss of PT Gramarindo Mega Indonesia and suspected mastermind of the embezzlement of Rp1.7 trillion from state-owned Bank Negara Indonesia through the issuance of allegedly fictitious letters of credit over December 2002 to July 2003. She fled to Singapore before trial.
  • Irawan Salim: Former president director of Bank Global, suspected of involvement in the issuance of fictitious loans and bonds worth at least Rp830 billion. Fled Indonesia in December 2004, just days before his bank was closed. Rumored to have gone to Singapore, Canada or Europe.

1 Comment

  1. sejarah reputasi buruk Indonesia yg berdampak sial utk selama umur hidup Bangsa dan tanah air. « my radical judgement by roysianipar said,

    […] at the end of 1968 offers a positive portrait of Suharto and the New Order regime he had assembled read full story Possibly related posts: (automatically generated)RELIGION IS CAN BE POISON TO HUMANS IF YOU ARE […]

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